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CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
ON SOME ACCOUNTS OF MEANING AND THEIR PROBLEMS1 
Nigel Mackay 
ABSTRACT. A number of influential theorists in psychotherapy and 
psychology rightly argue that meaning is central to psychology. 
However, they ground this insight on further claims that persons 
autonomously create meaning and reality; and that a constructivist,  
antirealist, postmodern philosophy offers justification for the cen-
trality of meaning. These further claims are mistaken. They confuse 
two different psychological phenomena, both called meaning, sym-
bolic meaning and meaning as salience. The latter, the meaning usu-
ally of concern to psychotherapy, is a relation between a person (spe-
cifically motives) and objects. It results from the interaction between 
persons and objects relevant to their motivational interests. It is part 
of the real, determinate world and in principle scientifically investi-
gable. The argument that meaning is part of autonomously created 
realities is incoherent. Further,  antirealist, postmodern constructiv-
ism depends on the realist assumptions about facts, truth and objec-
tive knowledge that it denies. The genuine insights of the meaning-
making movement require a realist account of knowledge, truth and 
objectivity.  
1. The Importance of Meaning  
Psychotherapists see themselves as helping professionals and, con-
cerned as they are with freeing individuals from their psychological 
burdens, they favour theories of human action that have regard for 
persons, their beliefs, wishes and perspectives. A major theme of the 
now dominant cognitive, cognitive-behavioural and allied thera-
pies—the centrality of cognitions in the genesis of psychological 
                                                             
1 This chapter is revised from Mackay, N. (2003a). Psychotherapy and the 
idea of meaning. Theory & Psychology, 13(3), 359-386, and Mackay, N. (2003b). 
On “Just not getting it”: A reply to McNamee and to Raskin and Neimeyer. 
Theory & Psychology, 13(3), 411-419. 
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distress—promotes just this examination of the person’s perspective 
and beliefs, the ‘internal world’. The focus of psychotherapy has 
moved from how objective conditions may control and be manipu-
lated to alleviate symptoms, to the ways in which persons’ percep-
tions of their world generate, and may be adjusted to alleviate, pa-
thology. At the same time a number of writers from inside and out-
side psychology have presented more radical critiques of main-
stream psychology (including psychotherapy and clinical classifica-
tion) and analyses of social processes (including psychotherapeutic 
processes) from constructivist and social constructionist stand-
points. Constructivism offers personal agency as the source of ac-
tion, and social constructionism offers social discourse as constitut-
ing mind and action. Both reject the objectivism of traditional em-
pirical psychology.  
 It is against this background that a theme that has always existed 
on the margins of psychology—most famously articulated in Victor 
Frankl’s book Man’s Search for Meaning (1964)—has developed into a 
flood of writings on the primacy of meaning and meaning-making in 
therapy and human conduct. Though it comes in many different 
forms, the theme of this literature is that human actions, including 
pathology and its remediation, are shaped by the meanings that 
events have for persons, or are created in discourse, rather than 
being determined by their objective features. To deal with this (how 
persons construct meaning and reality), psychology and psycho-
therapy require a non-objectivist metatheory. My concern here is 
with certain general features of this work, whose epistemological 
position and attendant ontology are incoherent and poorly serve 
the worthy humanistic aims that inspire the literature.  
2. Some Cautions  
I need to set out some cautions before presenting my argument. 
Much of what I say below is a critique of the constructivist metathe-
ory that is called on to justify the importance of meaning. Neverthe-
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less, my principal aim is not to survey and criticize constructivisms 
and constructionisms as such. Rather, I wish to clarify what can be 
sensibly understood by meaning in the psychotherapeutic context, 
and to consider what does and what does not constitute a proper 
metatheoretical foundation for the focus on meaning.  
 Moreover, presenting a critical analysis of this literature is par-
ticularly difficult. First, the writings represent so wide a variety of 
theoretical positions and therapeutic orientations that it would 
seem impossible to collect them in a single, coherent category, or 
that any critique could apply to most of them. To cite only select 
examples from this large literature, they may come from: develop-
ments in cognitive (Lyddon, 1995; Lyddon & Weill, 1997; Martin & 
Sugarman, 1996) or cognitive-behavioural therapy (Meichenbaum, 
1995); personal construct psychology (Epting & Neimeyer, 1984; 
Kelly, 1955; Viney, 1996); social constructionist reflections on thera-
peutic practice (Gergen, 1994, 1996; Gergen & McNamee, 2000; Hal-
lam, 1994; Wiener & Marcus, 1994); narrative therapies, both 
psychodynamic (Crossley, 2000; Sepping, 1999; Spence, 1982) and 
non-dynamic (Drewery, Winslade, & Monk, 2000; McLeod, 1997; 
Rosen, 1998; Russell & Wandrei, 1996); psychoanalysis, notably in 
the legacies of Gill (1994; Gill & Holzman, 1976), George Klein (1976) 
and Schafer (1976), but also more widely (Barclay, 1993; Brook, 1995; 
Cohler, 1992; Loewus, 1998); the counselling literature (D’Andrea, 
2000; Neimeyer, 1998); family therapy (McFadyen, 1997); or mar-
riages, combinations and revisions of these (Larner, 2000; Soldz, 
1988, 1996; Westerman, 1986). Indeed, many of the works cited 
above cross over theoretical and disciplinary boundaries. Further, 
they may draw general metatheoretical inspiration from one or 
more of an equally diverse range of sources: from Gergen, Hayek, 
Kant, Kuhn, Rorty, Vico, Wittgenstein, and many others. In using 
‘constructivism’ to refer to common ideas in various personal con-
structivist and social constructionist theses (except where I wish to 
point to certain differences), I am neither suggesting that these lat-
ter positions are identical, nor that each contains only one variety. 
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Danziger’s (1997) review of the Inquiries in Social Construction series 
(Gergen & Shotter, 1992–), for example, indicates well the range of 
social constructionisms. Similarly, there are several kinds of con-
structivisms (Chiari & Nuzzo, 1996b), and various authors (Gergen & 
Gergen, 1991; Stam, 1998) discuss the constructivism–
constructionism distinction. I am, however, following major writers 
in the meaning-making literature who appeal to constructionist and 
constructivist principles, as well as the themes they have in com-
mon. There is also at work here what Freud (1921/1959) so nicely 
called the “narcissism of minor differences” (p. 101), which leads 
authors to differentiate themselves sharply from their kindred, and 
magnify their divergence from otherwise similar psychologies of 
meaning. Yet, as I will try to illustrate, many differences, though 
genuine, are often metatheoretically inconsequential because there 
are deeper, shared conceptual problems that render all the con-
trasted positions seriously flawed. To foreshadow points I will dis-
cuss later: from the viewpoint of a conceptual critique, there is little 
consequence in arguing for the social or discursive rather than the 
personal nature of meaning construction if both are troubled by a 
common, unsound account of knowledge, or in claiming immunity 
from the accusation of  antirealism because one is a ‘social construc-
tionist realist’ if the latter is in self-contradiction.  
 A second problem for the critic accompanies the one above. Being 
largely psychotherapeutic rather than philosophical, the meaning 
literature is not overly concerned with clear definition and consis-
tency, and it presents a poorly delineated target. It is a large, loose 
literature using many different psychological vocabularies with all 
the eclecticism of those whose interest is mostly therapeutic prac-
tice. Making a selection of what I believe is a representative (in its 
philosophy rather than in its practice) group of works, it may be 
thought that I am oversimplifying the case against which I argue, 
and that what I say does not deal with more sophisticated positions. 
Yet my target is a kind of argument, informed, as I hope to show, by 
a set of epistemological and ontological assumptions. And while I 
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will illustrate its presence in a number of important theoretical 
writings, the first judgement to be made here is whether my criti-
cisms of this argument are correct or not, only secondarily how 
widely my critique applies beyond the borders of the necessarily 
limited number of works I can cite in evidence. My belief is, how-
ever, that the elements of the position that I criticize are indeed 
present in a very large set of writings, including the more sophisti-
cated versions, even if these differ from one another in other more 
or less important respects. And in support of this, it is just because it 
is so present that, repeatedly, in the interests of presenting them-
selves as a new paradigm or movement, influential authors can 
identify themselves as part of a meaning-focused “postmodern fam-
ily of therapies” (Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000b, p. 3), or Rosen and 
Kuehlwein (1996) can collect authors whose works lie in the inter-
sects of psychotherapy and, variously, narrative psychology, con-
structivism, social constructionism, postmodernism, developmental 
constructivism, epistemology and social discourse analysis and 
identify their common focus as meaning-making. (See also similar 
identifications in Held, 1995b; Lyddon, 1995; Lyddon & Weill, 1997; 
McNamee & Gergen, 1992b; Rosen, 1998; Schreiner & Lyddon, 1998).  
 A third difficulty in criticizing the meaning-making literature is 
that because much of it is in reaction to the orthodox empiricist 
view of psychology, there runs through it a hostility to the canons 
of argument and evidence, and to the ‘outmoded’ concepts of truth, 
reality and objective knowledge that are assumed to have failed 
with the empiricism that embodied them. A critique relying on 
these concepts, as I contend (and try below to show) it must to make 
any point at all, may be dismissed as merely exemplifying the very 
objectivism that the meaning-making literature does not (it self-
contradictorily claims) accept. Even the self-contradictory nature of 
certain theses argued by the meaning-making authors itself pro-
vides, as I will also illustrate later, a ‘defence’ against criticism: for 
each claim targeted by the critic of constructivism there are, in the 
endemically inconsistent literature, likely to be examples of 
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counter-claims that can be used to show that the critic has misread 
the position.  
3. Psychotherapy, Constructivism and Postmodernism  
A good distillation of the meaning-making literature appears in 
Neimeyer and Raskin (2000a). This volume comprises the “responses 
of 24 leading constructivist, narrative, and social constructionist 
scholars and therapists to an invitation to articulate their approach 
to clinical disorder” (Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000b, p. 3). Their number 
includes Arciero and Guidano, Efran and Cook, Gergen and 
McNamee, Goncalves, Leitner, Mahoney, Neimeyer, Raskin and oth-
ers. Their responses are clearly identified by Neimeyer and Raskin 
by the metatheoretical principles they have in common. That is, 
though the differences between positions are real enough, they 
press a common argument to justify their focus on meaning.  
 Neimeyer and Raskin (2000b) point out that the meaning-making 
approaches are part of a postmodern family of therapies through 
their common questioning of “the assumptions that undergird the 
‘establishment’, including much of psychiatric classification sys-
tems; through their ‘repudiation of traditional ontological assump-
tions’; and through their opposition both to the objectivism of tradi-
tional therapies that attempt to adjust clients to an objective, ‘sin-
gle, supposedly stable, and in principle knowable’ reality, and to the 
discourse of scientific research that serves to legitimize these 
therapies” (p. 5). Despite differences between family members, in-
cluding such important ones acknowledged by Neimeyer and Raskin 
(p. 6) as that over the social versus the individual sources of mean-
ing and the diversity of social constructionisms, psychologists of 
meaning-making see symbolic acts as representing “a matrix of 
meaning that actually constitutes the reality in which one positions 
oneself” (p. 5), and see psychotherapy as a conversation that trans-
forms clients through engagement in their (inter)personal matrices 
of meaning (p. 8). This view of psychotherapy is promoted as mean-
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ingful, liberating, optimistic, egalitarian, self-critical, reflective, tol-
erantly pluralist and opposed to the oppressive styles of much tradi-
tional therapy. These virtues are argued to flow from, and depend 
on, the ontological and epistemological theses of constructivism 
(within which term I include views that range from personal con-
structivism to social constructionisms), which is in turn a postmod-
ern position.  
 These themes go well beyond this particular collection. A brief 
survey of any of the several thousand publications thrown up by a 
psychological literature search on key words psychotherapy, mean-
ing and postmodern indicates why Neimeyer and Raskin are justi-
fied in seeing this as a species of approach and as increasingly influ-
ential. Psychologists of many kinds present therapeutic and other 
observations as evidence of the construction of meanings, and argue 
that the justification for this is a constructivist account of knowl-
edge and reality. In as much as constructivism is an elaboration of 
the “cognitive turn” in psychology (Mahoney, 1995a), it is in tension 
with the computational, information-processing metaphor that 
dominates experimental, and is sometimes taken as the core of cog-
nitive-clinical, psychology. However, various influential theorists 
(Bruner, 1990; Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000a; Neisser, 1993) and psycho-
therapists (Arciero & Guidano, 2000; Mahoney, 1995c; Mei-
chenbaum, 1995; Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000a) have, in spite of their 
contributions to cognition’s rise in psychology, expressed reserva-
tions about the direction that the cognitive turn has taken and the 
influence of the computational metaphor. Constructivism itself is 
reckoned by some a further stage of the cognitive revolution (Ma-
honey, 1995a). Moreover, the apologists for the cognitive, cognitive-
behavioural and allied therapies increasingly acknowledge their 
constructivist bases (Ellis, 1995; Hollon & Beck, 1994; Meichenbaum, 
1995). Their works appear in collections with explicitly constructiv-
ist therapies (Dobson, 1988; Freeman, Simon, Beutler, & Arkowitz, 
1989; Mahoney, 1995b; Perris, Blackburn, & Perris, 1988) where it is 
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stressed that the “focus of cognitive psychotherapy is on the devel-
opment of dysfunctional meaning structures” (Perris, 1988, p. 12).  
 This constructivist picture of the place of meaning in psychology, 
the often concomitant critique of computational, information-
processing psychology, and the attacks on empirical science and 
realism are restricted neither to a narrow band of therapists, nor to 
psychotherapy. One of the best known and most widely cited expo-
sitions of the meaning-making position is Bruner’s (1990). He com-
ments that the real aim of the cognitive revolution “was to discover 
. . . the meanings that human beings created out of their encounters 
with the world . . . and what meaning-making processes were impli-
cated” (p. 2). He disparages the shift from “meaning” to “informa-
tion,” from the construction of meaning to the processing of informa-
tion (p.4) that has diverted the human sciences into marginal issues 
(p. 1). Similar views are now so widespread in psychology—well be-
yond the psychotherapeutic domains referred to above, for example 
in educational (Durrheim, 1997; Glassman, 1996; Novak, 1993), de-
velopmental (Becvar, 2000; D’Andrea, 2000; Gubrium & Holstein, 
1999; McCarthy, 1994), psychoanalytic (Loewus, 1998; Soldz, 1996), 
clinical-cultural (Castillo, 1997, 1998; Schwartz, White, & Lutz, 1992) 
and social psychology (Gergen, 1994)—that they have become a vir-
tual orthodoxy among the metatheoretically minded. Conceptually 
related to the critique of epistemic foundationalism by Rorty (1998), 
which is widely cited in the constructivist literature, and to the de-
constructionism of Derrida (Derrida & Kamuf, 1991) and others, they 
make up a large proportion of the pages of psychology’s specialist 
theoretical journals and metatheoretical contributions to sub-
disciplinary journals. By contrast, in the psychotherapeutic litera-
ture there is little systematic critique of constructivist, postmodern 
epistemology (but for some exceptions see Erwin, 1997; Held, 1995a, 
1995b; Mackay, 1994, 1997; Zuriff, 1998).  
 For much of psychology’s history the study of meaning has been 
excluded from the empirical mainstream and embraced only by 
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various dissenting psychologies, and a return of meaning to central 
place in psychology is welcome. However, the reason for the earlier 
exclusion and, ironically, the current embrace seems to be much the 
same: the persistent idea that meaning, like the closely related con-
cept of the symbol (Petocz, 1999), is inherently unamenable to ob-
jective, scientific investigation. The concept of meaning is set about 
with confusion, even mystique, that interferes with its clear analysis 
and systematic explanation, but appeals to those suspicious of or-
thodox empirical science and its supposed assumption of “tran-
scendent superiority” (McNamee & Gergen, 1992a, p. 5). The recent 
explosion of interest in meaning has done little to dispel this view of 
meaning or clarify its place in psychology. I want to argue here that 
there are at least two major senses of meaning that are confused in 
the literature, and that this confusion drags into it a number of 
other muddled theses: that objective reality is unknowable, and so is 
not available to anchor meanings; and that such reality as is know-
able and meaningful is then constructed by persons or their dis-
course to yield many realities. However, neither giving meaning a 
proper place in psychology, nor good psychology, nor yet compas-
sionate therapy depends on the epistemology and ontology of  anti-
realist postmodernism. The positions, often simultaneously held, 
that reality is unknowable, indeterminate, is constructed by per-
sons, and that there are many realities are incoherent and self-
defeating.  
4. From Meaning to Meaning-Making  
The core argument in the literature on meaning-making moves 
from certain psychological facts and insights to epistemological and 
related ontological theses. The insights are of three kinds:  
 1. Meaning and the myriad ways people struggle to make sense of 
or, in the narrative psychologies, tell a coherent story about oneself, 
relationships, illness and experiences are of central importance to 
psychology.  
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 2. Observation shows that the same events and objects may differ 
greatly in meaning across individuals, times and cultures. Meaning 
is thus not an inherent part of objects of the world. (Importantly, 
these first two together are taken to carry a moral point: they de-
mand a recognition and explanation of individual and cultural 
variation, and oppose both the imposition of psychotherapists’ val-
ues and therapy conceptualized as a “behavioral health delivery sys-
tem” [Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000b, p. 7]).  
 3. Since meaning is not given in the objects of the world, it is only 
when persons interact with objects that meaning arises. This is 
nicely put in a saying of Epictetus used by Ellis (Dryden & Ellis, 1988, 
p. 124) as a slogan of rational-emotive therapy: “Men are disturbed, 
not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form 
concerning things.” Another way of expressing this is that events 
and things possess no property ‘meaning’: they are not meaningful in 
their nature.  
 So far, so good. However, a series of spurious inferences are gen-
erally drawn from these insights:  
 1. Meaning, not being a part of objective things or events, must 
then be autonomously (ex nihilo?) created by the person, or, in social 
constructionism, in the discursive practices of persons.  
 2. This creation of meaning is part of the literal construction of 
reality (or realities, as many in the literature like to say) by persons, 
perhaps in discourse, inter- or intra-personally, or in the telling of 
the narrative.  
 3. The result then is a constructed or subjective reality whose 
constructed objects do possess meaning; that is, are meaningful in 
nature.  
 These several inferences are assimilated to a larger antirealist 
philosophy that is argued to explain the insights and justify the im-
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portance of meaning in psychology. Some might object to the ‘anti-
realist’ description, perhaps preferring ‘postmodern’. Nonetheless, 
the thesis of the meaning-makers undermines the idea of truth, de-
nies the possibility of objective knowledge and implies that reality is 
dependent on minds. This, as I will return to argue later, is antireal-
ist in both epistemology and ontology.  
5. Meaning without Constructivist  antirealism  
This set of false but influential inferences may be countered by an 
examination of the concept of meaning to show that meaning is 
part of the objective, determinate world and thus in principle open 
to systematic examination. Moreover, support for the genuine in-
sights in the critique of traditional psychotherapy requires no re-
course to the postmodern antirealism of constructivism, but re-
quires a realist account of knowledge, truth and objectivity.  
5.1 Two Senses of Meaning  
Notwithstanding the genuine complexities in semantic theory, we 
may, following Petocz (2001), distinguish two senses of the term 
meaning, linguistic/symbolic and experiential. These are not two sub-
categories of a same kind, distinguishing between which is academic 
pedantry, but distinct, albeit related phenomena. Linguistic/symbolic 
meaning is where words, signs, acts, marks and tokens of various 
kinds have meaning in that they stand for or refer to something 
else. The symbolization may be formal, informal, idiosyncratic, con-
scious or unconscious. It includes as a subset the conventional sym-
bols of language and other representational systems. When used in 
propositions that make reference to states of affairs, these tokens 
become part of truth claims, claims about what is the case, about 
reality. Truth and reality are, as I will argue below, concepts dis-
torted in the meaning-making literature. A part of this seems to oc-
cur because they are inappropriately transferred from the context 
of linguistic (specifically propositional) to that of experiential 
ACCOUNTS OF MEANING & THEIR PROBLEMS 559
 
meaning, to suggest incorrectly that to ascribe meaning is to create 
personal or socially constituted truths and realities.  
 Experiential meaning is meaning as motivational salience, that where 
some object, event, process, thought, perception, and so forth, has 
particular salience to a person, a special place in the person’s sys-
tem of interests— established, it is important to note, via the per-
son’s beliefs about those objects. An event or object does not have 
experiential meaning merely because it stands for something else. 
(Confusingly, though, because almost everything humans do is me-
diated symbolically, the event or object is likely also to be a token, 
such as a word, with linguistic/symbolic meaning that does indeed 
happen to stand for something else.) Rather it has meaning in that it 
(or what it stands for by virtue of its separate, symbolic meaning) 
plays some special part in the person’s motivational economy. It is 
because a person has hopes of, fears, loves, loathes or desires some-
thing that that something or its symbol has experiential meaning 
for that person. We can be quite neutral about the nature of the mo-
tives involved, and need not subscribe to any particular theory of 
the primary motives (the need to make sense, to maintain the self, 
to have coherent cognitive sets, a non-teleological drive system, 
etc.) to make this point. Nor does it matter if motives are the prod-
uct of social interaction, shaped by discourse. It does not matter to 
the logic of meaning where the motives come from, how many and 
what kind they are; the meaningfulness of events is their motiva-
tional salience. The events most likely to have meaning (salience) 
for a person are those most likely to be instrumental in affecting 
important motives. One might expect, say, the behaviour of parents 
to be more meaningful for most persons than, say, the curvature of 
the far side of the moon. (Again, confusingly, the objects most likely 
to be given linguistic/symbolic representation are also those that 
are important to our major motives.)  
 To make this clearer it needs to be noted—and this is something 
that recent psychotherapies fail to grasp (Mackay, 1994)—that cog-
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nitions (beliefs, constructions, schemas, etc.) and motives (desires, 
wants, needs, wishes, etc.) always operate together: beliefs without 
related desires lead to nothing; desires without related beliefs imply 
no action. A complete intentional or ‘folk psychological’ explanation 
uses both the intentional categories of reason, belief (cognition) and 
motivation (conation), to explain some action. Some advocates of 
meaning psychology (Bruner, 1990) do refer to intentional explana-
tion positively, as though it were part of their programme to reha-
bilitate it. However, they provide clear analysis neither of the na-
ture of intentionality nor of its implications for psychology.  
 An object, event or experience, then, has meaning (salience) for 
persons both because of their motives and because of their related 
beliefs. It only has relevance to the person’s motives via beliefs 
about the relation of the object to the motive. From cognitive ther-
apy comes a typical example of a pathogenic belief, “unless I am 
loved, I am nothing” (Beck & Weishaar, 1989, p. 28), that precipi-
tates problems when a client’s relationship breaks up. What is not 
said by Beck and Weishaar, or, it seems, anywhere in the vast litera-
ture on cognitive and constructive therapies, is that this type of ex-
planation depends for its coherence on the additional fact that the 
client has a motive, albeit here the vague wish to be ‘other than 
nothing’. The relationship break-up has depressogenic meaning just 
because it is related by the belief to the motive. In the absence of 
the motive the cognition would mean nothing, and the client would 
not act. This depressogenic meaning is meaning as salience, not lin-
guistic meaning. Almost all the examples that therapists (not only 
the cognitive ones mentioned above) give of the meaningfulness of 
events for a person illustrate cases of meaning as motivational sali-
ence, not linguistic meaning. This is true both of the distress-
inducing meanings of events and the psychotherapeutic reconstruc-
tion of their meaning—although with the contemporary focus on 
cognition and construction rather than motive, the nature of the 
motives concerned is rarely made explicit.  
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 However, the implied reduction of all motivation to the single 
need to make sense, or the “quest for coherence” (Arciero & 
Guidano, 2000), a move much favoured in the literature on meaning-
making in psychology, is problematic. It is an irony that so many of 
the theorists concerned with motivational meaning and hostile to 
reductionism should ignore the variety and classification of mo-
tives, and how they might relate to evolutionary demands, effec-
tively reducing all motives to that of the need to make sense. Even 
the most casual examination of the impulse to make sense of events 
must surely prompt the question: why do humans want to make 
sense of things? And from this it follows that the process is for 
something that presumably has an evolutionary function. The ne-
glect of motivational theory in the wake of the cognitive turn is a 
major gap in psychology (Mackay, 1997).  
 The argument that meaning is created by persons is in part true. 
Something may be meaningful for me (or my kind) but not for 
someone else. It is also true that it is by virtue of things being mean-
ingful to me that my experience and behaviour are affected and ef-
fected. These insights are of enormous importance for the conduct 
of psychology and psychotherapy. Yet there is no legitimate infer-
ence from this to the idea that meaning is somehow autonomously 
created, and certainly not to the idea that reality is created. The 
very assertion that it is the same thing that is meaningful for me (us) 
but not meaningful for someone else is itself an affirmation of, and 
dependent for its sense on, the commonsense realist principle that 
things and events exist independently of the mind that is appre-
hending. The importance of the insights is that meaning may be in-
dividual—a point noted by Held (1995a)—or peculiar to a group. 
Grasping that meaning is motivational salience makes sense of this. 
That is, the particular circumstances that make an event meaningful 
to me (us) may not be present when another (another cultural 
group) encounters the same event. I (we) have a different history, a 
different genetic make-up, and, most importantly, the motives with 
which events engage are different in me (us) than in others. Motiva-
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tional structure at any one time, that is, the compound set of inter-
acting motives that are operative in a human, is the result of an in-
tricate learning history. This is the history of causal interaction be-
tween an evolved primate in all its physical, mental and social com-
plexity and the environment in which it acts. It is necessarily a de-
terminate history.  
 Determinism is apparently considered to be so obsolete—part of a 
defunct logical empiricism (Neimeyer, 1995a)—that no one in the 
meaning-making literature bothers to mount a proper argument 
against it. It is never explained how the appeal to case data made by 
constructivist psychotherapists could make sense without it. It is 
not explained how information learned from one situation could be 
applied to any other (which is presumably the purpose of reporting 
data and examples) without the determinist assumption that like 
causes have like consequences. It is not explained how autono-
mously created one-of-a-kind entities could feature in the regulari-
ties that psychology requires for general knowledge, without mak-
ing them in fact incomprehensibly irregular. Nor, on the other 
hand, is it explained how psychology could possibly do without gen-
eral information.  
 The analysis of meaning sketched above is realist and yet com-
patible with both the fact that events do not have meaning on their 
own, and the fact that meaning may be individual in character. Be-
cause meaning is a relation between persons (specifically motives) 
and the objects, events, words, experiences, said to ‘have meaning’ 
for the person, it is neither part of the apprehended object—a point 
rightly emphasized by cognitive and constructive therapists—but 
nor is it part of the apprehending object (the person)—a point ap-
parently not understood by them. Treating meaning as a relation is 
not part of any anti-objective metatheory. Relations exist as surely 
as anything else does. They are objective and studiable. Cognitive 
and constructive psychotherapists are correct in pointing out that it 
is not the events and objects in themselves that possess meaning, or 
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depress persons, but how persons construe those events. However, 
it is a mistake, encouraged by the role of mental nouns in our com-
monsense language (having a belief, a construct, etc.), to then con-
clude that the meaning must exist in, be a part of, the belief or con-
strual of the (meaningful) object. Moreover, this leads to a further 
problematic move: that of supposing that there is a realm of ‘con-
structed realities’ where, unlike objective reality, there exist things 
that are meaningful in their very nature. The constitutive feature of 
the proposed constructed, personal or social realities is just that 
they are meaningful. Yet there is no need to invent a special ontol-
ogy for constructed realities where, unlike objective reality, mean-
ing is a property of (constructed) things. ‘How persons construe the 
event’ indicates not an inherently meaningful, constructed, mental 
object, but the two terms of a relation subtended by persons (spe-
cifically motives) to a real object.  
 Underlying the problem is a misunderstanding of the logic of 
situations. This mistake is to allow that things may have their rela-
tions intrinsic to them—as constructed objects would have to have if 
they were meaningful in nature (Anderson, 1962b; Maze, 1983). The 
definition of an object or event, what makes it a particular thing, is 
independent of the relations into which it enters; either that, or it 
cannot enter into a relation because the relation is already (impos-
sibly) within it. An intrinsically meaningful entity, such as a con-
structed object is supposed to be, could not indeed be meaningful to 
me or meaningful to someone else because these are clearly rela-
tions, and the relation of significance (here meaning) is already 
within it. For any relation to hold, it must be between distinct, exis-
tent entities. The entities must have intrinsic properties and not be 
defined in terms of their relations to one another (as constructivists 
suppose constructed, meaningful objects to be), or either there 
would be nothing between which the relation could obtain or no 
relation so to obtain.  
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 This account of knowledge as a relation should not be confused 
with the social constructionist account of knowledge as relational. 
Discourse requires one to distinguish between relations and the en-
tities that enter into relations, so social constructionists do some-
times talk as though there are people involved in “interchanges 
among people” that then produce “the terms in which the world is 
understood” (Gergen, 1985, p. 5). However, social constructionism 
also holds that relations constitute knowledge, mind, persons and, 
indeed, everything—given that reality itself is constructed. Rather 
than holding that there are entities that enter into relations, one of 
which is that between persons and facts, and which we call knowl-
edge, constructionism holds that persons, facts and much else that 
might be considered entities are somehow relational in themselves. 
In doing so it commits itself to the possibility of constitutive rela-
tions in which it is supposed that things may be relational in their 
nature, yielding a world of relations mysteriously without the enti-
ties to enter into relations.  
 Returning to the processes involved in the meaning relation: cer-
tain items happen to effect changes in a person’s motivational 
structure. Chocolate to hunger is a relatively simple example, if 
somewhat removed from psychotherapy. Because of the way hu-
mans have evolved, eating chocolate effects changes in hunger lev-
els (e.g. by altering blood sugar), gives taste and social experiences, 
and so on. Knowledge, or rather belief (because error is always pos-
sible), about what the item means (it is food, tastes good, makes one 
feel satiated, is deemed a reward by parents, etc.) follows from these 
events. Of course motives are complex and develop and change over 
time, perhaps coming into conflict with one another. (Motivational 
conflict is the basis of psychodynamic conceptions of disorder.) 
Chocolate and its associations may mean both assuaging of hunger 
and a guilt-inducing breach of diet, confirming a view of oneself as 
weak and bad. Chocolate and its symbolic representations come to 
have a meaning that, say, a block of wood does not, just because of 
their motivational effects. The general point is that the meaning of 
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something is the relation of that something to the person’s motiva-
tional structure via belief. This relation is in turn a consequence of 
the past impact of that kind of thing on the person’s motivational 
states. These motivational states may be ‘socially constructed’ in a 
commonsense use of the phrase, in that social factors, institutional 
and familial demands and sanctions, and even the assumptions in 
our language are involved in the production of motives.  
 Further, this is an objective, determinate process, open in princi-
ple to scientific examination. The meanings of events are, variously, 
individual, shared within groups and universal. However difficult 
they may be to trace, their causes are in principle specifiable. Mean-
ings are not the autonomous creation of persons. If the latter were 
true, their arbitrariness and unpredictability would make nonsense 
of all systematic psychological investigation. Nothing learned from 
any one case would apply to any other; the autonomous creation of 
an event or object would render it sui generis. Understanding that 
meaning as salience is an objective, determinate relation returns it 
to scientific examination. However difficult its study might be, and 
however poorly prepared contemporary psychology is for it, there 
is no conceptual bar to the systematic, scientific investigation of 
meaning (see also Petocz, 1999).  
5.2 From Confusion about Meaning to the Undermining of Truth  
There are several links between the constructivist treatment of 
meaning and the postmodern subversion of the idea of truth. One 
appears to be abetted by the confusion between linguistic meaning 
and meaning as salience. Linguistically meaningful sentences gen-
erally have some descriptive function or reference, and may be true 
or false, or, if complex, partly true and partly false. The notion of 
truth is bound up with that of the proposition to which linguis-
tic/symbolic meaning is fundamental. However, something that is 
meaningful in the sense of salient is not subject to truth conditions, 
at least not by virtue of its meaningfulness. The meaning of some-
thing for me necessarily depends on my beliefs about it, but not on 
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the truth of those beliefs. The psychotherapy casebook is replete 
with examples where the meaningfulness of untrue beliefs brings 
about distress. The affordable act of spending a few hundred dollars 
on clothes precipitates a bout of anxiety and depression in someone. 
Anticipating a visit to the formal and middle-aged bank manager 
brings on a panic attack in a well-off young professional. The events 
(spending money, encountering the manager) have significant 
meanings for the clients, but they are neither true nor false. The 
contents of the beliefs that constitute the pathogenic meanings 
‘spending on myself confirms that I am a selfish and unworthy per-
son’ or ‘bank managers are figures in authority and will harm me’ 
are propositional and may be true or false. But their truth or other-
wise is irrelevant to their meaningfulness. Beliefs, how we construe 
the world, may profoundly affect behaviour (presumably through 
links with even deeper beliefs and motives such as childhood fears 
of parental disapproval) without being true. So, although it is true 
that spending is meaningful for me (because I believe it confirms me 
as selfish and unworthy), objectively, my belief may not be true: the 
act itself is not necessarily unworthy. This is so however important 
the act’s meaning to me may be for understanding my behaviour, 
my motives, and so on, and however relevant it is to psychological 
investigation.  
 The problem is not solved, nor are the conceptual difficulties of 
antirealism avoided, by arguing that a belief such as ‘spending on 
myself confirms that I am a selfish and unworthy person’ is one of 
various possible realities and is ‘true for me’ just because it is mean-
ingful. It may be a useful shorthand to say that something is ‘true 
for me, but not true for others’, and it may be a striking metaphor to 
convey the importance of beliefs for our psychology. Moreover, the 
therapist’s recognition of the distressing importance of this to the 
client may also be valuable. But to suggest that this is literally a per-
sonal or socially constructed truth is simply false, and to suggest 
that there are many realities (Gergen & McNamee, 2000, p. 347; Ma-
honey, 2000, p. 52; Raskin & Lewandowski, 2000), truths for me or 
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my kind, but not for others, is equally false. Inventing alternative 
epistemologies and ontologies, and special theories of truth, to deal 
with this is to move from insight to nonsense.  
6. Constructivist Philosophy, Criticism and Contradictions  
Naturally constructivists defend their position against the sort of 
criticism made here. They do this is several ways. One is by making 
claims about the constructivist position, particularly on language, to 
bolster the view that knowledge and reality (their own and their 
critics’) are indeed constructed. A second is by making claims about 
their critics’ positions to show that their critics’ position depends on 
mistaken principles. In this case we are concerned with realism, al-
though, as I will illustrate, they often confuse realism with both 
positivism and scientific orthodoxy, and so miss the target. How-
ever, there is an extra twist to the constructivist defence: construc-
tivism not only offers positive accounts of important psychological 
concepts but, because it reinterprets the role of language by dimin-
ishing or abolishing its referential function and, relatedly, treats 
logic and argument as contextually dependent linguistic practices 
(or language games), it undermines opposition by attacking the very 
reasoning on which argument depends. It is, for example, common 
to reject critics’ views because they rest on concepts of truth, rea-
son, reality and objectivity deemed outmoded, or are supposedly 
committed to an absolutist view of truth. And, thirdly, there can be a 
strong moral tone in the constructivist defence. Just as they claim 
their epistemological and ontological pluralism implies and gener-
ates a tolerance of others’ views in therapy and elsewhere, so any-
one arguing for the possibility of objective knowledge may be tarred 
intolerant and absolutist. This results in a mix of (a) claims about 
the nature of constructivist discourse and (b) rebuttals of accusa-
tions. 
 The critiques by constructivists of the presumed position of their 
critics, their attacks on reasoning and logic, and their attribution of 
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hubris to realists are nicely illustrated in the two responses 
(McNamee, 2003; Raskin & Neimeyer, 2003) to the original version of 
this paper (Mackay, 2003a). I deal with these matters here, not be-
cause I want to show that constructivists are a dastardly lot and 
would stop at nothing to blacken critics, but because these several 
ways of attacking rational evaluation of constructivism are engen-
dered by theses central to its philosophy. This is ultimately fatal not 
just for rational discourse, but to any and every argument that con-
structivists wish to offer of psychological concepts.  
7. Constructivists on Language and Reference 
7.1 We Make No Assertions, We Only Offer an Alternative Discourse: 
The Possibility of Language and Truth without Reference  
 Arguments that I have been making in this paper depend wholly 
on the fact of reference: that language refers to situations; makes 
claims that various states affairs obtain, while others do not; and 
that though one inference is valid, some other is not. A position on 
language is central to constructivist views. Constructivists generally 
identify themselves as part of the ‘linguistic turn’, and deny or di-
minish the referential nature of language, instead stressing that 
“language… is an engaged activity, not a tool we use to talk about 
the world while remaining unrelated to it” (McNamee, 2003 p. 388). 
This assertion (for that is what it is) that constructionists are assert-
ing nothing, merely exploring the possibilities of alternative dis-
courses in a spirit of unprejudiced investigation where “diversity 
and deviation are honored” (Gergen, 2001, p. 420), is commonly pre-
sented as a rebuttal of the accusation of  antirealism (Neimeyer, 
1995c, pp. 341–342). It enables them to dismiss critics who argue 
against constructivist assertions by denying that they asserted or 
claimed anything. Thus when I argued (Mackay, 2003) that, say, a 
constructivist claim is factually wrong, or ends in contradiction, 
Raskin and Neimeyer and McNamee treat this as failing to grasp the 
functions of constructivist discourse, mistaking the “engaged, em-
bodied discourse (performance) of persons in relation” (McNamee, 
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p. 394) for constructivist claims about the nature of some state of 
affairs. The assumption is that discourse is possible without, and 
incompatible with, reference. Yet their actual discursive practices 
are, as they must be to say anything, in direct contradiction to this: 
they “address Mackay’s argument” (McNamee, p. 388), set out “lib-
erating social charters” and stake “an identity claim” (Raskin & 
Neimeyer, p. 400). No one can do this without talking about states of 
affairs, real and supposed. Nor could anyone understand what they 
meant were they not referring to things. Reference is a condition of 
discourse.  
 In case it is supposed that these views are only part of a naive and 
unsophisticated constructivism or constructionism or peculiar to 
the responses mentioned, consider Gergen, perhaps the most influ-
ential of the social constructionists, who is regularly cited in the 
meaning-making literature. He makes many of same flawed argu-
ments using the same polemical devices. Among several of his 
works on psychotherapy theory (e.g. Gergen, 1996; McNamee & Ger-
gen, 1992b) is an article co-authored with McNamee (Gergen & 
McNamee, 2000) in the Neimeyer-Raskin collection (2000a) in which 
they present a critique of the discourse of disorder and its dehu-
manizing values, and raise the “central concern of constructionists . 
. . the processes by which human communities generate meaning” 
(p. 334). But underlying this are their theses on language, reference 
and truth. They tell us about the “challenges to the established 
truths and values” of groups (p. 335). They present different dis-
courses (physics, literary theory, mental disorder) as different 
“games” (p. 334), without acknowledgement that this would make 
the transformative discourse of their own presentation incoher-
ently both part of a particular game and outside all games in its ref-
erence to the particular games. And soon they are writing of “alter-
native realities” (p. 336) afforded by reconceptualizing disorder. In 
short, they justify their sometimes insightful critique of traditional 
mental health approaches, and the importance of meaning, with an 
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antirealist attack on the referential function of language, and on the 
accompanying idea of truth.  
 As he must, Gergen uses language normally enough to talk of re-
ality, to make claims, deny attributions, and tell a critic that he 
“simply gets it wrong” (1999, p. 113). Yet in a typical, vigorously as-
serted rejection of his critics’ accusation that he undermines the 
ideas of reality, reference and empirical truth, and in the very proc-
ess of showing that he does not, and is not a relativist, Gergen (2001) 
tells us that he is “not trying to ‘get it right’ about the nature of sci-
ence, reality, the mind, truth, objectivity, and so on… [His] chief 
aims are transformative” (p. 419)—as if those two are incompatible. 
And even while denying that he undermines the notion of truth, 
Gergen says that truth is “truth within traditions” (p. 422), writes of 
the “production of empirical truth within communities” (p. 421), 
and claims that “the very concepts of truth and falsity as tradition-
ally conceived are themselves so flawed as to be irrelevant” (p. 429), 
and that “social conventionalism . . . inhabits the very process of 
verification/falsification” (p. 421). Like the psychotherapeutic 
meaning-making constructivists treated above, he repeatedly puts 
terms and phrases that smack of objectivism and realism, such as 
“get it right” (p. 419), “what really exists”, “really there” and “inde-
pendent of language” (p. 425), in scare quotes, or uses other devices 
to undermine them and distract argument from the issue, derisively 
referring, for example, to the “rage for the real” (p. 423)—this in 
spite of his earlier (Gergen, 1998) appeal for a non-adversarial form 
of discussion of these issues! But he seems oblivious of the fact that 
in the very act of criticizing Maze (2001) and others (about the ne-
cessity of factual assertion to discourse), he is repeating the error 
that Maze points to, asserting the fact that he is not asserting fact 
(Gergen, 2001, p. 429). Wriggle as he may, Gergen cannot get off the 
hook of the ordinary realism of assertion: the codas he appends to 
his statements on truth—truth is “within traditions” (p. 422) or pro-
duced “within communities” (p. 421)—in order both to justify his 
claims that he retains a concept of truth and yet to claim that truth 
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is socially conditioned are themselves assertions about states of af-
fairs in just the sense that Maze and others are trying to make clear, 
they are assertions (of the putative fact) that truth is socially consti-
tuted. These codas are themselves unqualified claims to truth of ex-
actly the kind that Gergen says must be qualified. Should he, in a 
vain attempt to step outside the inconsistency of this self-
referentiality, wish to say that the claim in the codas, that truth is 
always ‘within traditions’, is itself ‘within traditions’, he would set 
off on a futile and infinite regress.  
7.2 We Are Not ‘Anti Realist,’ It Is Just That There Are Many Reali-
ties, and Yours Is Just One of Them: Truth as Relative to Discourse 
 One means of neutralising criticism is to argue that, far from be-
ing antirealist there are in fact ‘many realities.’ This might seem to 
preserve some sort of realism and ward off the attack that construc-
tivism degenerates into an impossible relativism. However, this 
generates the classic contradiction of ontological dualism (see Hib-
berd, 2001), a dualism that McNamee and Raskin and Neimeyer 
claim to have overcome, though their work suffers from its standard 
problems: even to talk about two modes of reality or discourse is to 
situate oneself in a third, and set off on a vicious infinite regress. 
The metatheoretical discourse in which a critic like Mackay is told 
that there are many and equally valid discourses is, they disingenu-
ously argue, itself merely one discourse among many, just “a way of 
understanding the world” adopted on a “pragmatic basis” (Raskin & 
Neimeyer, 2003, p. 398). Note, however, McNamee never says what 
constitutes ‘understanding’ versus misunderstanding, nor what 
might make some procedures ‘useful ways of going on together’ and 
others not, nor do Raskin and Neimeyer tell how to decide between 
‘competing realities’ (in what does competition consist given these 
are literally incommensurate?), nor yet from within what discourse 
we would be “languaging” (McNamee) when we made such deci-
sions. Whenever someone talks of many realities we may ask: what 
reality is the proposition ‘there are many realities’ itself about? 
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Clearly, if it is true, then it is true about reality. Whichever reality 
that is, it cannot be among the number of realities to which the sen-
tence refers. Thus, if true, this means there are many realities plus 
one. Then, of course, we may ask of the assertion ‘there are many 
realities plus one’, ‘to what reality does this refer?’, compounding 
the realities indefinitely. A coherent ontology merely claims that 
there is one order of the real, to which this claim itself and all oth-
ers putatively refer. The attack on the idea of absolute or “timeless 
truths” (Neimeyer, 1995b, p. 12) or depiction of the realists as at-
tempting to “compel universal assent to any one truth” (Raskin & 
Neimeyer, p. 400) is an appeal to the liberal mind offended by the 
arrogance of apparent claims to certainty. It is little better than an 
argumentum ad populum, and it makes the double mistake in imply-
ing that realism both claims an absolute reality, and certain knowl-
edge.  
Many constructivists might object to a bald description of their po-
sition as antirealist, perhaps preferring postmodern (Mahoney, 
1995a; Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000b). Many, like Mahoney, affirm a re-
alism of sorts (Mahoney, 1988, p. 3, 2000, p. 51), yet deny its princi-
ples and implications by asserting that “psychological realities are 
inherently private” (Mahoney, 1995a, p. 9), and literally “we manu-
facture realities’ (Mahoney, 2000. p. 52). The meaning-making litera-
ture also undermines realism through parody and misunderstand-
ing that prevent any careful examination of realism’s theses. The 
literature misleadingly identifies objectivism with positivism 
(Bruner, 1990, p. 108; Mahoney, 2000, p. 51); and equates representa-
tionalist with realist theories of knowledge (Arciero & Guidano, 
2000, p. 93; Chiari & Nuzzo, 1996a; Neimeyer, 1995a, p. 168, 1995b, p. 
14; McNamee, 2003, p. 388). Words such as real (Mahoney, 1988, p. 
3), reality (Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000b, p. 5), facts (Neimeyer, 1995a, 
p. 165) or objective (Mahoney, 1995a, p. 197) are discredited by be-
ing put in scare quotes. In places, however, the meaning-making 
literature reveals its anti-objectivism quite explicitly. Efran and 
Clarfield (1992), intending to defend constructionist therapy against 
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the criticism that it is an “anything goes” approach, say that “‘truth’ 
is a set of opinions widely shared”, concurring with the quotation: 
“What is true is what I can’t help believing” (p. 201). Neimeyer 
(1995a, p. 165), in a pragmatist attempt to avoid commitment to fac-
tuality and reference, shrinks from the idea of “truth” in favour of 
“consequences’, and replaces “facts” with “interpretations” to make 
consensus the criterion of knowledge (p. 168). In this philosophy, 
truth is contextual, and contexts are a matter of choice: “Knowledge 
is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in the light of the perspective we have chosen to 
assume” (Bruner, 1990. p. 25). The same author talks of being “freed 
from the shackles of ontological realism” as the basis for a promis-
ing psychology (Bruner, 1990, p. 101). And there are disingenuous 
claims that reality is indeed relative (Dowd & Pace, 1989). 
7.3 We Privilege No Discourse: You Privilege Realist Discourse. We 
Are Immune from the Charge of Infinite Regress  
 Constructivism rejects “privileging one form of discourse over 
another” (McNamee, 2003, p. 389), that is, nothing said in one dis-
course (which can have meaning and truth only internal to itself) 
could be true across the range of incommensurable discourses. In 
direct contradiction to this non-privileging pluralism, construction-
ist/ivists in practice forever claim privilege for the position they 
advocate in preference to others, pluralism. Any comment that the 
constructionist/ivist makes about the metatheoretical discourse is 
itself necessarily outside some metatheoretical discourse. It is a 
meta-metatheoretical discourse, if you like. Yet, no matter how of-
ten the critic points out that the ultimate comment about discourse 
or pluralism is of a meta-order to, outside of, the other discourses of 
which it speaks, and paradoxically is still referential, the construc-
tivist retorts that that (and, tu quoque, anything you say, critic) is 
also from some (other) ‘assumptive framework’. In contempt of the 
canons of argument and evidence, they neither accept that they are 
in a regress that destroys their argument, nor offer a proper solu-
tion to it. They magic it away and, unconcerned by regress or con-
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tradiction, carry on as usual. Raskin and Neimeyer even claim as a 
virtue the “candor with which [constructivists] acknowledge . . . 
assumptive frameworks” (2003, p. 398).  
7.4 Debate, Rationality and Logic Are Contextual 
 Both McNamee (2003), and Raskin & Neimeyer (2003) illustrate 
nicely my early comment that evidence, logic, rational argument 
brought in opposition to constructivism may be dismissed on con-
structivist principles. They relativize logic (McNamee questions 
which or whose logic or rationality), ignore contradiction 
(McNamee’s title is “bridging incommensurate discourses”) and the 
mode of debate that depends on dealing with contradiction, and 
hold: we assert nothing; we do not say you are wrong, and we are 
immune “to the critique of contradiction” (McNamee). Debate, 
proof, refutation, assertion and even rationality and logic are dis-
missed as an optional discourse we choose not to enter. Construc-
tionists merely propose “useful ways of going on together” 
(McNamee). The charge of incoherence is to be rebutted not by 
showing that it is false but by rejecting the very idea that “we 
should “forbid” any theoretical position” (Raskin & Neimeyer, p. 
407). Of course, this is contradicted in practice. McNamee, for ex-
ample does dispute arguments: she says in normal declarative, ref-
erential language that reference is not central to language, and that 
she can “fully dispose of Mackay’s critique” (p. 390). She starts a 
chain of argument with “In fact . . . ” and concludes it by denying 
the relevance of factuality, of “which side” has “the facts straight” 
(p. 389). She argues “contrary to Mackay’s claim” (p. 391); she 
agrees; she disagrees; she asserts; she debates. The contrast is even 
more striking between Raskin and Neimeyer’s forbearing claim that 
constructivism is just one “way of understanding the world” forbid-
ding no position, on the one hand, and their practice, on the other. 
They “correct Mackay’s caricature” (p. 398), show how Mackay’s 
charges of “ ‘incoherence’ . . . lose their force” (p. 400), deny “con-
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structivism is . . . hostile to scientific discourse” (Abstract), and 
much more.  
 Could anyone reading these constructivist papers sincerely be-
lieve that they are not disagreeing with, asserting contraries to and 
rejecting my arguments, but merely exploring equal but different 
ways of understanding? Are we really to believe that when she says 
“Mackay’s critique of contradiction does not stand” (p. 391), 
McNamee is claiming nothing? Does what they say reside, immune 
from contradiction, in a discourse where truth is only intra-
discourse stipulation? Of course not: It is a statement given in ordi-
nary referential discourse about what McNamee takes to be the 
case, a direct assertion that Mackay’s critique is false. McNamee and 
Raskin and Neimeyer are not exempt from the criteria of rational 
discourse. They cannot coherently claim to not claim anything. 
Their many contradictions are just that, contradictions.  
8. Constructivist Mischaracterisations of Realism: 
8.1 Realists Claim to Know an Absolute, Transcendent Reality or 
Truth 
 A common criticism of realism is that realists claim to know an 
absolute, transcendent reality or truth. However, a cogent realism, 
precisely because it is not a relativism, does not hold that things 
may be relatively, more or less, real (Anderson, 1962a). There is no 
absolute versus inferior reality. All the real is of the same order, that 
indicated by the copula ‘is’. The ‘is’ in ‘the cat is on the mat’ is no 
more and no less a claim about real states of affairs than it is in ‘the 
end of the world is nigh’, or “Personal identity is constructed in the 
mutual relation between lived experience and the ongoing composi-
tion of one’s life story” (Arciero & Guidano, 2000, p. 94). The differ-
ences between these three assertions are that the second is false (I 
hope), it mis-takes reality, and the third requires further elucidation 
of its terms to know exactly what it is asserting. Yet they are all 
claims that something is the case, about reality. The idea of absolute 
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versus relative or inferior reality is associated rather with idealism, 
many of whose confused theses, such as the dependence of the real 
on mind, reappear in postmodernism and constructivism.  
8.2 Realism Holds That Scientific Knowledge Is Indubitable 
 Some of the difficulty that antirealists have with realism is the 
incorrect assumption that realism implies that scientific knowledge 
is indubitable, without the possibility of error, leading to the jibe 
that it is an “authoritarian” epistemology (Mahoney, 1995a, p. 197). 
For Raskin and Neimeyer (2003) realism becomes the “the naive re-
alist notion that science directly traces reality” (p. 405). Various 
constructivisms are excessive reactions to the realization of the 
possibility of error in perception or belief. These include the psy-
chotherapeutic constructivisms under examination here and even 
the constructivism of experimental cognitivism (percepts are repre-
sentations constructed from degraded sensory data). The detailed 
defence of realism’s capacity to deal with error is beyond the scope 
of the present paper (see, however, Galloway, 2000; Michell, 1988; 
Rantzen, 1993). Nonetheless, the logical point may be made that the 
possibility of error depends on the possibility of truth. No view that 
explicitly or implicitly denies the concept of truth, as constructivist 
antirealism does, genuinely provides for the possibility of error; it 
merely means that there is neither truth nor error. Indeed con-
structivism is compatible with the possibility of error only in the 
sense that it is so hopelessly incoherent that it forbids no position.  
8.3 Realism Is Foundationalist  
 Another criticism levelled at realism is that of being foundation-
alist. Foundationalism, like essentialism (discussed below), is both a 
complex concept and a handy term of abuse. It is linked to at least 
two major ideas: (a) a distinction between things-as-experienced 
and the unknowable things-as-they-are (a distinction held by many 
personal constructivists, though not social constructionists); and (b) 
in philosophies of science such as positivism, a distinction between 
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what is surely, directly, foundationally apprehended (perhaps even 
by convention and consensus), for example operations, sense data, 
sensations and other phenomena, and knowledge that is con-
structed from these. 
 Critiques of the orthodox philosophies of science have made 
much use of the foundationalist charge. Raskin and Neimeyer apply 
this to the realist position on meaning that I developed saying that I 
see my “philosophical bases as foundational absolutes” (2003, p. 
397). However, realism opposes the relativism in this foundational-
ism holding that all knowledge is of the same order.  
 My rejection of these as misunderstandings is not idiosyncratic. 
Hibberd (2002) says realism and “social constructionism as an epis-
temology” both2:  
1. accept the Heraclitean doctrine that things are constantly chang-
ing;  
2. recognize the reality of relations and an interactionist ontology;  
3. reject the thesis of essentialism;  
4. hold the view that there are no such things as pure universals;  
5. reject any epistemology which involves mediated cognition;  
6. reject any theory of language which has statements or proposi-
tions as linguistic entities that are true if they correspond to reality;  
                                                             
2 Note that social constructionism and personal constructivism differ on at 
least (5) and (7), and I agree with some of McNamee’s differentiations. For 
example, social constructionists do not accept the idea of the individual 
autonomous creation of meaning, or that meaning is ‘inside the heads of 
autonomous individuals’. 
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7. reject any theory of meaning which makes meaning a constituent 
of the mind;  
8. recognize the importance of context to social life;  
9. hold the view that there is no such thing as an individual un-
touched by social processes;  
10. reject the view that scientific inquiry can be free from the mo-
tive of social interests. 
 There is no ontological distinction between any foundational 
facts and a superstructure built upon them. Curiously, it is Raskin 
and Neimeyer who revert to the dualism of “built” theoretical sys-
tems versus foundational “theoretical assumptions’ required, they 
tell us, in “every system for making sense of things’ (Raskin & 
Neimeyer, 2003, p. 398).  
8.4 Realism Offers a Disembodied Account of Meaning  
 In her critique of my paper, McNamee (2003) provides the clue to 
repeated misconstructions of realist views: “Mackay offers a familiar 
critique” (p. 387, emphasis added). Almost line by line the two re-
sponses (McNamee, 2003; Raskin & Neimeyer, 2003) debate and at-
tack a ‘familiar’ realism of their own construction (something like 
the mixture of positivism and cognitive representationalism found 
in psychology textbooks) that realists do not support. Indeed, realist 
colleagues are exasperated not so much by criticisms but by the un-
comprehending depiction of realism. As one reading these re-
sponses brutally said: “They just don’t get it.” McNamee contrasts 
two positions: (a) that of Rorty, constructionists and others of the 
linguistic turn whose focus “can be considered social in that lan-
guage… is primarily an engaged activity” (p. 388) and who hold 
“there is no possibility of separating observer from the observed” 
(p. 390); to (b) that of those who treat language as “a tool we use to 
talk about the world while remaining unrelated to it” (p. 388), “con-
ceptualizing language as a system . . . we use to represent or picture 
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the world” (p. 389), and maintaining a “Cartesian subject–object dis-
tinction” (p. 388). Yet realism holds neither the imputed disembod-
ied view nor the copy theory of language. One should not equate 
“representationalist [the person’s knowledge of the world is medi-
ated by representations or constructs—which most varieties of per-
sonal constructivism believe; Mackay, 1994, 1997] with realist theo-
ries of knowledge” (Mackay, 2003a, p. 373).  
 These critics also conflate very different senses of separateness or 
detachment between the person and the world. There is required 
for any talk about the ‘knower and known’ a logical distinction be-
tween (a) the one who enters into a particular relation (knowledge) 
to the object and (b) the object. Maintaining this distinction avoids 
the muddle of, say, simultaneously asserting a conceptual unity of 
knower and known (we “can never detach the knower from the 
known,” Raskin & Neimeyer, 2003, p. 406) and a conceptual distinc-
tion between them (the “structure of the knower becomes as impor-
tant as the object known,” p. 405). The logical distinction between 
the two terms of the knowledge relation is neither McNamee’s ‘un-
related-disembodied’ distinction, nor the Cartesian distinction that 
McNamee incorrectly attributes to realism (2003, p. 388)—realism is 
explicitly against Cartesian idealism (Anderson, 1962a).  
8.5 Realism Is Essentialist  
 Another charge that constructivists direct against opposition is 
that of being essentialist. In the case of realism it is misdirected. 
McNamee argues “against universal, essential or representational 
reality” (2003, p. 392). Raskin and Neimeyer (2003), like other con-
structivist responses to realist critiques, repeatedly attribute essen-
tialism to me by arguing that realism insists “all inquiry be rooted in 
. . . essentialism” (p. 398) and that “a realist approach . . . assumes 
there to be . . . universal essences” (p. 400).The apparently unshake-
able conviction that realism must be essentialist leads them to make 
tendentious additions to opponents’ words and concepts – again not 
uncommon in the constructivist mischaracterisation of realism. De-
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terminism is re-presented as “utter mechanistic determinism” 
(Raskin & Neimeyer, 2003, p. 403) (neither ‘mechanism’ nor ‘mecha-
nistic’ occurs in my text). They recast ‘intrinsic properties’ as “in-
trinsic essences” (p. 404). 
 Essentialism3 is often attributed, as it is by Raskin and Neimeyer, 
as an all-purpose denunciation, like calling someone a Stalinist at a 
Trotskyite meeting. In ontology it is a doctrine about what proper-
ties do and do not make up the ‘essences’ of things. It normally im-
plies a distinction (one realism rejects) between essential and non-
essential aspects of things, generally draws upon the idea (which 
realism also rejects) that there are certain universal essences in 
which particulars partake to be that sort of thing, and involves a 
dualism of universals and particulars (which realism also rejects). 
Essentialism is not, contra Raskin and Neimeyer, the same as the 
logical requirement that “entities must have intrinsic properties 
and not be defined in terms of their relations to one another” (p. 
404).  
8.6 Realists Believe in a Transcendent Reality  
 In their critiques McNamee criticizes the idea that “reality . . . 
underlie[s] appearances” (p. 389) and Raskin and Neimeyer approve 
of not “attempting to adjudicate whose claims are ‘true’ or ‘false’ 
with reference to some transcendent reality beyond the conversa-
tion itself” (p. 400)4. Yet the idea of a transcendent reality and its 
concomitant, contrasting realm, a reality as experienced, is alien to 
direct realism. It belongs instead to theories of indirect knowledge, 
such as those Raskin and Neimeyer rightly acknowledge many con-
structivist colleagues hold (and they endorse themselves, Neimeyer 
& Raskin, 2000b). It is when one both (a) denies ‘antirealism’, that is, 
“believe[s] that the world exists” yet (b) asserts “but . . . people only 
                                                             
3 See Hibberd (2002) on why both realism and social constructionism reject 
essentialism. 
4 Though they talk of therapeutic practice, it seems meant as a general the-
sis. 
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know [it] indirectly through their constructions about it” (Raskin & 
Neimeyer, p. 405) that one creates an “external reality beyond hu-
man perception”, in short, a transcendent reality.  
8.7  Realists Are Absolutists 
 Raskin and Neimeyer say that “Mackay sees his philosophical 
bases as foundational absolutes . . . this philosophical absolutism 
makes it impossible for Mackay to even entertain constructivism” 
(pp. 397–398). McNamee disparages “closed pronouncements of how 
things already or really are” (p. 391). We all can and do say how 
things are. This is not making closed pronouncements of how things 
really are with “apodictic certainty” (Raskin &Neimeyer’s phrase, p. 
398). I can only repeat that and why realism does not claim an abso-
lute reality: A cogent realism, precisely because it is not a relativism, 
does not hold that things may be relatively, more or less, real. There 
is no ‘absolute’ versus ‘inferior’ reality. All the real is of the same 
order.  Antirealists incorrectly assume that realism implies that sci-
entific knowledge is indubitable, while in fact only theories like re-
alism that, unlike constructionism/ivism, allow the possibility of 
truth can allow the possibility of error.  
8.8 We Are Tolerant: You Are Intolerant 
 The defence of constructivism also can degenerate into a kind of 
moralism, as may be gathered from some of the reported comments 
above. The latter arise out of an invalid inference: that to hold that 
truth is possible implies apodictic certainty, absolute knowledge, 
and so on. This is the other side of the invalid inference from toler-
ant epistemology to tolerant interpersonal conduct, say in psycho-
therapy. It is nicely illustrated in the reply (Raskin & Neimeyer, 
2003) to the original version of this paper (Mackay, 2003a). They 
portray not just the realist position but the author as authoritarian, 
discomfited by a “tolerantly pluralist epistemology” because “it 
does not compel universal assent to any one truth” (p. 40). They say 
that the author is unable to “even entertain constructivism”, is “of-
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fended by the challenge to scientific authority” (p. 405) and he in-
sists “that some theories should be forbidden” because they are “in-
coherent within his own procrustean conceptual framework” (p. 
407). My argument that there is an unexplained inconsistency be-
tween dismissing determinism and doing empirical research that 
makes no sense without determinate, predictable events is trans-
formed to “he insists constructivists are required to refute [deter-
minism] before proceeding” (Raskin & Neimeyer, p. 403). Mackay 
“simply cannot comprehend” the “evidence and arguments that 
constructivists offer” (p. 405). And more: his work is “vituperative” 
(p. 400), “dogmatic” (p. 407) and “procrustean” (pp. 399, 407), exem-
plifying “intellectual intolerance” (p. 407) and “absolutism” (p. 398)!  
8.9 Antirealism as Unsustainable  
Of course, authors do not take seriously the implications of, or sus-
tain, the antirealist constructivist philosophy that they promote 
and identify with postmodernism. As illustrated in the work of Ma-
honey, Neimeyer, Gergen and others, they cannot; it is self-
contradictory and unsustainable. On every page of the constructiv-
ist and social constructionist literature one finds assertions of puta-
tive fact: about the problems with positivism, about the nature of 
science, about the importance of meaning, about events that hap-
pened in the life of clients, about the logic of explanation, about the 
history of psychotherapy, about the errors of their critics, and so 
on. All of these are claims about what is the case, reality, about what 
is true, in the most ordinary sense of true. It beggars belief to think 
these writers don’t mean these assertions to be true, not just for 
themselves, but for those to whom they write—or why would they 
write it? To say, then, that these assertions are neither true nor 
false (and what would the status of that claim be?), or that there is 
no access to reality to warrant them, is in contradiction to every 
statement in the literature. It is incoherent. Similarly, the claim that 
the notion of contradiction is merely part of an optional set of so-
cially constructed rules (Gergen, 2001), a logic game (and how would 
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one know if a rule had been rightly applied or not?), excludes itself 
from rational discourse.  
 Neimeyer, Bruner and other theorists of meaning advocate, con-
duct or appeal to empirical studies, treating the events to which 
they refer as facts. They also appeal to observations of individual 
and cultural variations in meaning or other factual discoveries to 
support their views. Following a discussion of anti-objectivism, and 
a few pages after disparaging the idea that reality is “in principle 
knowable” (Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000b, p. 5), Neimeyer and Raskin 
appeal to the piece of knowledge that “a number of constructivist 
and narrative therapies have been evaluated by controlled outcome 
studies, with promising results” (p. 9)! Empirical studies, that is, dis-
cerning patterns and correlations between events in the world, de-
pend for their sense on the very idea of objective knowledge that 
Neimeyer and others are attempting to repudiate. Similarly, the ar-
gument to constructivism from the variability of meaning is based 
on evidence: it is an argument from the facts of the situation to a 
denial of factuality. Now, my characterization of my target authors 
as antirealist may mislead. I mean, of course, that they are realist, as 
all participants in proper discourse must be, but they attempt even in 
that realist discourse to defend antirealist theses, and this is incoherent. It 
is the incoherence, not strictly the antirealism, that is the problem. 
This is why calls for realists to show what realist psychology can 
produce (Stam, 2001) miss the point. A non-realist psychology ipso 
facto produces nothing. Realism proper is not a theoretical option 
but immanent in discourse (Hibberd, 2001), or as Searle engagingly 
puts it (Allman, 1998; Searle, 1995, p. xiii), a “condition of sanity”. A 
requirement of any psychology is to produce an account of human 
action that is coherent. If this could be done within the sort of 
transformative and critical aims that Gergen promotes, or the re-
construing therapeutic programme of personal constructivists, it 
would be realist. The depth and persistence of self-contradiction 
and blindness to conflicting implications in constructivist writings 
can be astonishing. To take Gergen again: even in responding to 
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Maze’s (2001) accusation that he is in self-contradiction and admit-
ting that this is a ”substantive issue” (Gergen, 2001, p. 428), he at-
tacks the very idea of self-contradiction, treating the logic of iden-
tity (any meaningful term must have a logical opposite) as merely a 
set of discretionary game rules, cultural artefacts. In response to 
Maze’s critique of Derrida’s ‘both/and’ logic—a scheme designed to 
allow that something can simultaneously be both true and not true, 
itself and not itself—Gergen asks, “what if one does not wish to play 
by Maze’s particular rules?” (p. 429). The answer is of course that 
one relegates oneself from rational discourse—the point that Maze 
so nicely made.  
 It may be thought that Harré’s (1986) ‘constructionist realism’ is a 
counter-example to the critique of social constructionism I have 
been pressing. I am unsure of the compatibility between Harré’s ex-
plicit realism and the position I have been setting out here—that 
would be the topic of another study. However, realists are paradoxi-
cally concerned not strictly with demonstrating the value of ‘the 
realist position’ but rather, through critical analysis, with prevent-
ing (realist) positions that degenerate in their implications into in-
coherence. There is nothing in the obligation that a psychology be 
consistent with the realism necessary to discourse that is incom-
patible with the view that social and discursive practices affect how 
people act, or shape mentality, motive and meaning. It is when con-
structivism, presented as it commonly is as a general account of 
knowledge and reality, tells us that objective knowledge is in prin-
ciple not possible, or that there are many incommensurable realities 
created by persons, that it collapses into incoherence, and so may 
be termed antirealist.  
9. The Implications of Metatheory for Practice  
Two problems are created by attempting to support a tolerant plu-
ralism and relatedly a stress on meaning in psychotherapy by ap-
peal to a tolerantly pluralist philosophy of constructivism. First, it is 
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simply wrong to think that the latter either genuinely supports the 
former, or that tolerance of differences and varieties of meaning 
within psychotherapy is the same thing as the (impossible) toler-
ance of different, constructed truths and realities. Pluralist episte-
mology—the idea of many equally valid truths and realities con-
structed by persons—is self-contradictory and utterly permissive: it 
is as supportive of therapeutic dogmatism as of therapeutic toler-
ance.  
 The second problem is that it gives a false and grossly oversimpli-
fied picture of the relation of metatheory to practice. This is the 
case both with the promotion of constructivism as a metatheory 
with implications for practice, and with the critique of the effects of 
orthodox empiricism on practice given in the meaning-making lit-
erature. Just as we are told that pluralist tolerance is the isomorph, 
and implication, of a tolerantly pluralist epistemology, so we are 
told that an objectivist theory of knowledge is an authoritarian epis-
temology and an isomorph of the dehumanizing, intolerant practice 
to which it leads. This creates the false expectation that metatheory 
must have this sort of direct application to practice, in particular 
that epistemology guides the morality of practice. The request that 
realists show what a realist psychology, in this case a psychother-
apy, can produce is one consequence of this expectation. Yet this 
view of the application of metatheory to practice, in particular that 
there is a moral carry-over from metatheory to practice, is one part 
of what I contend is discredited: epistemology can only show vice or 
virtue, be authoritarian or tolerant, if knowledge is a social (moral) 
construction. It wrongly assumes that knowledge is a social con-
struct.  
 It is, moreover, an expectation that I cannot live up to: there is no 
easy-to-apply metatheory that will tell psychotherapists how to 
treat clients. The tolerance urged by the psychotherapists of mean-
ing is to be encouraged, not because truth and reality are mere con-
structions and we must respect others’ realities, but because even 
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the most casual examination of the history of psychology, and of the 
record of psychotherapy, reminds us of the facts that we often get it 
wrong, how hard it is to get it right, and the dangers of closed-
mindedness in such a difficult discipline. Of course I believe this to 
be true and not a mere construction. If I held the latter view, then I 
would indeed have licence for authoritarian or any other kind of 
practice.  
 Nonetheless this is not a counsel of despair. Analyses that point 
out problems in theory and metatheory at least tell us the places 
where not to find the right answers, and this has useful conse-
quences. I have argued that constructivist argument fails to support 
a meaningful psychotherapy. However, if my account of meaning is 
on the right lines, that is, much of the meaning in which therapists 
are interested is motivational, then that demands an examination of 
motivation, a topic almost abandoned in the epistemic focus of cog-
nitivist and constructivist therapies (Mackay, 1994, 1997). Outside 
the clinical field, various authors have argued that the clearing out 
of  antirealist assumptions in such areas as cognitive-experimental 
and self psychologies (Maze, 1983, 1991), measurement theory 
(Michell, 1997) and the study of language and symbolism (Petocz, 
1999), while not in itself producing empirical theory, promises the 
possibility of explanations that are not self-defeating. Valuable 
studies of social concepts (meanings), of the power relations that 
affect human conduct, and of the psychotherapeutic consequences 
of how persons construe the world have come from constructionist 
and constructivist psychologies. Yet in the end they are under-
mined, not legitimized, by constructivist epistemology, and can be 
carried out without any assumption that reality is created by per-
sons.  
10. Conclusion  
The impulse to constructivism is founded on genuinely important 
insights, amongst which is the importance of meaning. Attacking 
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constructivist philosophy is, then, easily seen as an attack on the 
importance of meaning, and an endorsement of the conventional 
empirical psychology that has, for the better part of a century, rele-
gated meaning and intentionality to the margins. Constructivists 
are right to stress fallibility, flexibility and tolerance, and to be wary 
of orthodoxy—particularly in such a confused discipline. We can 
join with Neimeyer and others in their focus on meaning and their 
objection to treating psychotherapy as a “behavioral health delivery 
system” (Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000b, p. 7). Scrutiny of such matters 
as the ethnocentrism of conventional clinical psychology and its 
instruments (Castillo, 1997; McLeod, 1997) and the promotion of the 
awareness of cultural variation is similarly important. And critical 
analysis of orthodox empirical psychology is vital: much that passes 
for ‘behavioural science’ is a mere empiricalism, the application of 
powerful but dubiously relevant statistical methods to inadequate 
primary data in order to support conceptually inadequate ‘models’. 
However, my argument has been that these points may all be made 
independently of constructive metatheory and postmodernism with 
its incoherent epistemology. Indeed, as Petocz (2001) points out, the 
poor handling of meaning by those hostile to science and to the pos-
sibility of objectivity merely serves to entrench conventional em-
pirical psychology’s narrow view, that meaning (both motivational 
salience and symbolic) is irrelevant to psychology.  
 The meaning-making literature presents an erratically moving 
target. Hostile to the canons of argument and evidence, it is careless 
of consistency, mixing an apparent acceptance of commonsense 
realism with attacks on basic realist concepts: truth, reality and ob-
jective knowledge. Often, accusing a constructivist of antirealism 
brings in reply an apparent affirmation of realism—“as a construc-
tivist, I have never said . . . that there is no ontic world but I keep 
saying that we cannot know it” (von Glasersfeld, 1991, p. 1)—or the 
evasive tactic of claiming that it is not of importance (Neimeyer, 
1995c), or merely one optional form of discourse (Gergen, 1998; 
Shotter, 1993). However, most of the work is aimed not just at open-
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ing up the possibilities of practice but at justification of this by un-
dermining the possibility of objective knowledge. This is an attempt 
by the postmodern ’anti-establishment’ programme to undermine 
the very standards of objectivity that would be a challenge to their 
position—while overlooking the fact that such standards would also 
be required to support postmodern, constructivist or any argument. 
If there is no objective and knowable reality, but only incommen-
surable and particular subjective or social realities, then fact, evi-
dence, logic, rational argument, brought in opposition to construc-
tivism may be dismissed as part of a defunct epistemology. Thus it 
mischievously makes the constructivist position itself absolute and 
indisputable, and quite unlike its self-portrait as tolerantly pluralist 
(Gergen, 2001; Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000b)—while caricaturing real-
ism as absolutist and “genuflecting to objectivism” (Mahoney, 2000, 
p. 51) or a “rage for the real” (Gergen, 2001, p. 423).  
 The attempted subversion of the notions of objectivity, truth and 
reality is deeply dangerous for psychology and for rational debate. It 
erodes the very requirements of intelligible, meaningful discourse—
an irony given the constructivist and social constructionist litera-
tures’ emphasis on meaning and discourse. The self-protection built 
into the doctrine of constructivist epistemology is surely as insidi-
ous as any orthodox dogma in science and psychology.  
 The real problems of contemporary psychotherapy, psychology 
and the analysis of meaning should not be allowed to push psycho-
therapists into the arms of deeply irrational philosophies—however 
dressed up they may be in fashionable academic terms. It is the in-
teraction of persons with objects via beliefs that gives meaning to 
events and objects, not the autonomous creation of reality by per-
sons. The meaning of something is the salience of that something to 
the person, specifically motives, and is objective. This renders the 
genesis of meaning determinate and in principle investigable. 
Meaning is returned to its place as a legitimate and important topic 
for psychology.  
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